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C.A. NO. 09-2350
_________________________________________________________________________
IN THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_________________________________________________________________________
AARON C. BORING and
CHRISTINE BORING, husband and wife,
Appellants,
v.
GOOGLE, INC., a
California corporation,
Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________________
Appeal from Western District of Pennsylvania
2:08-cv-00694
APPEAL FROM ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 17, 2009, DISMISSING
PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT, GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 12(B)(6) MOTION ON ALL
COUNTS; APPEAL FROM ORDER DATED APRIL 6, 2009, DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
_________________________________________________________________________
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
AARON AND CHRISTINE BORING
_________________________________________________________________________
Gregg R.
Zegarelli, Esq.
PA I.D.
#52717
412.765.0401
Dennis M.
Moskal, Esq.
PA I.D.
#80106
412.765.0405
Z E G A R E L L
I
Technology & Entrepreneurial
Ventures Law
Group, P.C.
Allegheny
Building, 12th Floor
Pittsburgh,
PA 15219-1616
v.412.765.0400
f.412.765.0531
TABLE OF CONTENTS......................................................... i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES..................................................... ii
REPLY..................................................................... 1
I. OVERVIEW......................................................... 1
II. GOOGLE’S
STATEMENT OF FACTS...................................... 3
III. STANDARD
OF PLEADING............................................. 7
IV. PRIVACY.......................................................... 8
V. TRESPASS........................................................ 14
VI. PUNITIVE
DAMAGES................................................ 17
VII. INJUNCTION...................................................... 18
CONCLUSION
AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF......................................... 20
ADDENDUM
1: CASE DISTINCTION TABLE....................................... 23
CERTIFICATE
OF COMPLIANCE................................................ 39
CERTIFICATION
OF IDENTICAL BRIEFS AND VIRUS SCAN......................... 40
CERTIFICATE
OF SERVICE................................................... 41
Aquino v. Bulletin Co., 154 A.2d 422 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1959)......... Addendum 1
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009)................................... 7
Benitez v. KFC Nat'l. Mgmt.
Co.,
. 714 N.E.2d 1002 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1999)............................. Addendum
1
Borse v.
Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963
F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1992) ...... Addendum
1
Burger v. Blair Med. Assocs., Inc., 964 A.2d 374 (Pa. 2009)........ Addendum 1
California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207 (1986)......................... Addendum
1
Chambers v. Montgomery, 192 A.2d 355 (Pa. 1963)............................ 17
Commonwealth v. Robbins, 647 A.2d 555 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)........ Addendum 1
DeBlasio v. Pignoli,
918 A.2d 822 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007) ........... Addendum
1
Diaz v. D.L. Recovery Corp.,
. 486 F. Supp. 2d 474 (E.D.
Pa. 2007).............................. Addendum
1
Dietemann v.
Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245
(9th Cir. 1971)...................... 13
Feld v.
Merriam, 485 A.2d 742 (Pa.
1984)................................... 17
Franklin Music Co. v. American
Broad. Cos.,
. 616 F.2d 528 (3d Cir.
1979).............................................. 18
Jones v. WTXF-Fox 29, 26 Phila. Co. Rptr. 291, 294-95
. (C.P. Philadelphia Aug.
13, 1993),
. aff'd, 644 A.2d 813 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)........................ Addendum 1
Kelleher v. City of Reading, No. Civ. A. 01-3386,
. 2002 WL 1067442 (E.D. Pa.
May 29, 2002).......................... Addendum
1
Kline v. Security Guards, Inc., 386 F.3d 246 (3d Cir. 2004)........ Addendum 1
Konopka v.
Borough of Wyoming,
. 383 F. Supp. 2d 666 (M.D.
Pa. 2005).............................. Addendum
1
Mulligan v. United Parcel
Service, Inc.,
. Civ. A. 95-1922, 1995 WL
695097 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 1995)......... Addendum
1
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984)....................... Addendum 1
Pacitti v. Durr, No.
Civ. A. 05-317, 2008 WL 793875
. (W.D.Pa.
Mar. 24, 2008), aff’d,
. 310 Fed. Appx. 526 (3d Cir. 2009)................................ Addendum
1
Pro Golf Mfg., Inc. v. Tribune
Review Newspaper Co.,
. 809 A.2d 243 (Pa. 2002).......................................... Addendum
1
Schiller v. Mitchell, 828 N.E.2d 323 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005),
. passim
Shorter v. Retail Credit Co., 251 F. Supp. 329 (D.S.C. 1966)....... Addendum 1
State v. Chaussee, 866 P.2d 643 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).............. Addendum 1
State v. Domicz, 907 A.2d 395 (N.J. 2006).......................... Addendum 1
Streisand v. Adelman, No., SC 077-257
. (Super. Ct. Los Angeles
Co. Dec. 31, 2003)........................ 9,
10, 14
Strickland v. University of
Scranton,
. 700 A.2d 979 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1997)............................... Addendum
1
Tucker v. Merck & Co., No. Civ. A. 02-2421,
. 2003 WL 25592785 (E.D.
Pa. May 2, 2003),
. aff’d, 102 Fed. Appx. 247 (3d Cir. 2004)......................... Addendum 1
United States v. Evans, 27 F.3d 1219 (7th Cir. 1994)............... Addendum 1
United States v. Ventling,
678 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1982)............. Addendum
1
Vaughn v. Drennon, 202 S.W.3d 308 (Tex. App. 2006) ................ Addendum 1
Wells v. Thomas, 569 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Pa. 1983).................. Addendum 1
Wolfson v.
Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413
(E.D. Pa. 1996)........................ 13
Rules
F.R.E. 201(c)............................................................ 3,
6
F.R.C.P. 8................................................................. 14
F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6)........................................................ 1,
7
F.R.C.P. 12(d).............................................................. 2
I. OVERVIEW.
Freedom begins with the right to be left alone. The Borings claim their right, as Americans,
to be secure in their property, and to enjoy their property without intrusion
or fear of intrusion. Google is a
profiteer acting at its own risk for its profit. That is the balancing of it.
Google pooh-poohs the claim, and we understand their argument:
Google is just like the “police,” or a “lost driver” [Google Br. 28].[1] But, in point of fact, with such traditional
examples, Google wants us to forget exactly the thing that is at issue: the technology. It is the 21st Century panoramic 360° “rolling” digital camera, with
worldwide publishing through Google’s pervasive indexing system, that gives
this issue context.
We cannot deny: 1) Google has a new technology that is a social
phenomenon; and 2) new technologies intrude in new ways.
The recording, indexing, ease of access and dissemination
of data
— some more or less personal — yields its own social concerns that requires
this Court’s attention.[2] The Borings ask this Court to give meaning to
the truth: the expectation of seclusion is not absolute, it is relative. It is not secluded or not secluded, it is the
expectation of seclusion from
something. The Borings had an overt
statement of their expectation of privacy, “Private Road No Trespassing” (emphasis added).
Yet, Google kept coming, tires crunching, and kept recording,
and at the barrier of the Borings’ home itself, kept recording, and, with
nowhere to continue but to drive into the
pool, turned around in the driveway, and kept recording.[3] Google was not on a street, Google was not
taking pictures from the street, and no street was in view. But, Google published the pictures anyway,
worldwide. [Borings’ Br. 7-8]
An offense is contextual.
This case, prima facie, is about a plaintiff who has pleaded seclusion
and an overtly stated expectation of privacy, “Private Road No Trespassing” (emphasis added) [A31, ¶11]
II. GOOGLE’S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Google, incidentally by
footnote, begins its Statement of Facts:
Footnote
1: “This statement is based upon the allegations of the Amended Complaint, the
images upon which the Plaintiffs’ claims are based...and publicly available
information that is subject to judicial notice. . .”
Footnote
2: “The Court may take may take judicial notice. . .”
[Google Br. 8; see n. 3, supra] This Court should note that Google does not simply
say that judicial notice “was taken.” Google cannot, because it was not. See,
Fed. R. Evid. 201.
Google’s Statement of Facts is tied to the Klausner Declaration [SA-1],
which was first designated with Google’s Responsive Brief [See, n. 3, supra], and
which was referenced only once in the dicta
of footnote 1 of the Opinion; it was not referenced in the Opinion body.
[Opinion, n. 1; A9]
1. Allegations. The Amended Complaint
speaks for itself.
2. Images. All proper evidence
is “based upon” the pleadings at some level, but the Borings did not plead, for
example, a contract where the claims are based upon something with self-evident
reliability. See, In re Burlington Coat
Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410 (3d Cir.
1997). The images in Exhibit G of the
Klausner Decl. are not the images upon which Borings’ claim is
based. Indeed, the Klausner Decl. appears to
admit that fact by using double-off wording:
Attached hereto as
Exhibit G are . . . images obtained in connection with Street View and associated
with the address....”
[SA-2 ¶9] The Court should note that Google did not simply say
that these are the “published pictures” upon which the claims “are based.” Google cannot, because they are not.
The
pictures submitted do not move or have the multiple angles, traverse points,
zoom capability and/or the superimposed directional arrows which disclose the
panoramic 360° nature. [Google Br. 24; A30 ¶7] They are
not as seen in the marketplace, or that would be removed by Google’s
“mitigation system.” Google selected static 1°
pictures that fail to show the closest recorded location to the Borings’
home at the turn-around point in front of the pool. [See n. 3, supra]
The pictures lack any proper foundation whatsoever.
Google
did not use available technologies to render a fair dynamic representation of
Street View that makes the service — and the Borings’ claim — so
compelling. [See, Google Br. 1]
Indeed,
the Exhibit G pictures fail to show how the driver kept coming, and coming, and
kept recording and recording and recording, even when the driver was in front
of the pool and had to turn around.
Google kept recording. Google
automatically publishes panoramic 360° pictures to the world using the
latest technologies, and, yet, presents only a subset of pictures “in connection
with Street View and associated
with the address” to the Court.
[SA-2 ¶9]
If
Google’s pictures show anything, they show the secluded nature of the
property. [SA-26, not even the closest
picture; see n. 3] What is it about SA-26 that does not clearly
tell a driver that, in continuing forward, he or she will hit a house, swimming
pool or garage: turn off the camera now and turn around? But the car kept coming, and coming, and
recording, and recording. And then
Google published anyway, worldwide.[4]
Everyone fully understands that there is a website mitigation policy. [Borings’
Brief 7-8; SA-27; A8] It is now three
strikes: 1) past the signage anyway; 2) going right up to the home anyway; and
3) publishing worldwide anyway. We
understand that there is a mitigation policy. [Id.]
3. Public Information “Subject to Judicial
Notice.” The Magistrate Judge only mentioned
the Klausner Decl. in dicta, so the
Magistrate Judge did not need to be precise.
Indeed, the Magistrate Judge never referred to the Klausner Decl. in the
body of the Opinion, nor ever used words denoting taking notice. If the Magistrate Judge did consider those
exhibits, it would be error for doing so, and further error for failing to
consider the Borings’ counter exhibits. [See, generally, n. 3]
Google turns the Opinion upside down: the body of the Opinion
is dicta, and the footnote is controlling.
[Google Br. 17, 37 and 48] Google
carefully states that the “public information” placed before this Court is the
subject matter of which the court “may take judicial notice” but, Google did
not say that it occurred. [Google Br. 8]
Possibly, Google suggests that the pictures were an accurate
reflection of the circumstances on the date and time represented in the
pictures (which requires its own relevance foundation, as stated). Or, possibly, Google is suggesting “someone
else did it too” such as for the proposition of a legal right to publish itself.
There is a distinct difference between noticing the temperature on a
certain date from a reliable scientific source, as distinguished from
judicially noticing that scientific source’s legal right to publish the weather
because it has done so.
If we understand Google’s point, Google’s intrusion, trespass
and worldwide publication was legally permitted in conclusion, because: Yahoo
has published aerial pictures from 3,000 feet (5,000 feet, or 100,000 feet
[being no record for the altitude]), while not trespassing, and because Yahoo’s
legal right to publish aerial
photography is “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”[5] Or, no two reasonable people could differ
that an aerial picture at 5,000 feet is the equivalent of being on the Borings’
property in front of their door.
Yahoo’s pictures support the claim
of Google’s right to publish, MapQuest’s pictures support the claim of Yahoo’s
right to publish, Google’s pictures support Yahoo, etc., round-robin.
The fact that judicial notice is taken for one purpose as
reliable, does not mean that it is taken for another. For example, a governmental site may be
reliable for textual mete and bounds information because that textual
information is taken from submitted recorded deeds, but not reliable for the
legal or factual integrity of its photography.
Indeed, the undersigned hereby certifies that Allegheny County removed
its picture of the Borings’ home. [SA-10] Following is an itemized response:
Exhibit A., Search [¶3, SA4]: The
only page not included in
the Klausner Decl. (Exhibits A or B) was the Legal Disclaimer page that is exactly the page that disclaims the
reliability of the information, concluding “Therefore, sale-to-assessed-value comparisons can be misleading.” [SA-4, lower right hand corner] The link provided in the Klausner Decl. at
SA-4 is directly accessible but is not the default page; it is a “deep link.”[6]
Exhibit B., Assessment Record [¶4, SA5-SA12]:
Google refers repeatedly to the Images tab [SA10], which
formerly contained a single-frame outdated picture of one side of the Borings’
home. Allegheny County removed the
picture from the website. The
undersigned represents that the picture was removed by Allegheny County and is
no longer published.
Exhibit C., D. and E., Aerial Photographs
[¶¶5-7, SA-16]: It does not follow that an aerial photograph
at 5,000 feet is probative of the right to trespass on the Borings’ land, past
signage, take pictures and publish them worldwide. The pictures are fundamentally distinct: “at 5,000 feet” is not “on my property at my door, past ‘Private
Road No Trespassing Signage.’” The
pictures are not reasonable equivalents for any proposition at issue in this
case.
Exhibit F, Boring Deed [¶8, SA-18]: Google
apparently expended resources to obtain the Deed later when it should have done
so earlier.
Exhibit G, “Pictures Associated/in
Connection” [¶9, SA-21]: Discussed separately, above.
Exhibit H, “Mitigation Removal” [¶10, SA-27]:
As a legal issue, the existence of a mitigation, after the fact,
is not appropriate for consideration on a 12(b)(6) demurrer, before the
fact. As a factual issue, if anything, it
demonstrates the limited market, complexity, equipment, education and cost
necessary for a regular person who “has discovered” a problem even to manage
it.[7]
For
the reasons stated, whether or not judicial notice was taken, for the reasons mentioned
above, there would be in error.
III. STANDARD OF PLEADING
Google asserts the complexity of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009)
for the most simple privacy and trespass pleading case. These causes of action are not derived from
complex statutes that require technical analysis to raise the foundation of the
statutory intent.
A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
Id., at 1949. If anything is tortured long enough it might
scream, but, in fact, the error below is not from the pleading of the basic
claim of conduct liability, it is
because the Magistrate Judge finally adjudicated damages using improper facts and making improper speculations
against the required standard, as a matter of law. [Borings’ Brief pp. 6,
14] Liability and damage questions are
distinct. Certainly, regarding the
trespass count, with Google’s inclusion of SA-21, this Court now sees the truth
of what the Borings previously asserted. [Borings’ Brief, p. 13., ¶6 (“assured summary judgment on
liability”).
IV. PRIVACY.
Google cited approximately
50 cases regarding the privacy count.
The Magistrate Judge only cited four cases, and, accordingly, did not
rely upon many of Google’s cited cases in rendering the Opinion. The Borings welcome Google to cite these
“facts and circumstances cases” but, even a simple review of privacy rights
cases demonstrate that privacy rights issues are naturally fact-specific
because each context is unique. The
necessity for Google to use so many cases is a self-evident admission that
privacy questions are fact specific.
It appears that
Google scoured for any case where the plaintiff was unsuccessful, and applied
any supportive out-of-context rule. For
example, Google cited to government cases, prisoner cases, criminal
investigation cases, and cases that were tried or for which evidence was
adduced in due course (which is exactly the relief sought in this appeal).
Because of the volume
of cases, please see the attached “Privacy
Distinction Table,” Addendum 1, p.
23 which is incorporated herein by this reference. We address the distinctions in the attached
table.
Cutting through
Google’s barrage of cases, there appears to be a fundamental reality disconnect
by Google on the legal/factual convergence within a claim. Google keeps stating that it is the
reasonable equivalent to an invited “guest” and “police officer” [Google Br.
14], and that an aerial view from 5,000 feet or so is the reasonable equivalent
of physically entering land, past signage and physically sitting on someone’s
driveway. [Google Br. 42] The Borings
disagree.
Because the Borings
may conditionally imply a request for the public service of the government to
which it pays taxes and has a matched conditional expectation in that context,
does not mean that the Borings waive their private property rights to Google
and countless other profiteers, seriatim, with panoramic 360° cameras taking pictures for
worldwide publication. Even Allegheny
County removed its picture.
But, let us take a step back and think about the effect of
Google’s argument. The case was
dismissed with Google physically sitting
on the Borings’ driveway (1,000
feet from mailboxes and the public road junction) with no “street” in “view.”
The reason:
The Borings, common people, have no gate
[Google Br. 2], no fence surrounding the property or guard dog,[8]
the government took a picture [Google Br. 22] (now removed from its website),[9]
the notice of the recorded deed is ineffectual [SA-17], Yahoo has aerial
pictures from thousands of feet [SA-13], MapQuest has aerial pictures from
thousands of feet [SA-15], Live Search has aerial pictures from thousands of
feet [SA-16], airplanes take aerial pictures from thousands of feet [Google Br.
28], the “[Borings’] property is visible from the air” [Google Br. 8],
“[Barbara Streisand] has taken no steps to preclude persons passing by in
airplanes from seeing into her back yard.” [Streisand,[10],
P32:L14, Google’s Br., attached].
On these factors, who is safe?
What property is safe? The
Borings are just everyday people.
The Borings are not
injured as a matter of law because they have not installed a fence and because
they receive sunshine into their yard.
Must we become “hermits” not to be ogled? Must we now concede the sun?
“The Borings' yard is visible from the air...” [Google
Br. 8] [Streisand] has taken no steps to
preclude persons passing by in airplanes from seeing into her
back yard. [Streisand, p. 32:L14, emphasis supplied].
Amber waves of grain, guard dogs, fences and opaque domes.
Google correctly admits that Appellants pleaded the “Private Road No Trespassing” sign, and
then asserts, as if required, that there is no averment of a fence or gate that
would “keep a person from approaching.” [Google Br. 2] Google’s presupposition is that Americans
must have, and must plead, barriers of power to prevent entry. [Google
Br. 2] Google blames the Borings, common
people, for not fencing themselves in against Google, and uses aerial
photography at 5,000 feet for the proposition that Google is rightful to be at
on the Borings’ driveway.
Google’s requirement of a barrier fence is as
illogical as arguing law-abiding citizens must incarcerate themselves from the
criminals.
Through pleading rules, Google puts us at unhappy war with
ourselves, mere words not being enough.
The idea of necessary gates and guard dogs is abhorrent to the
principles of a free and civilized society, although, it is admitted that such
things are necessary to defend against rodents and wild dogs. We are not brutes. Words should be enough.
________________________________
After reviewing
Google’s many cases, there is a tool that assists in analyzing the nature of
the claim for the underpinning offensiveness, in light of our shrinking world:
Offense = (Seclusion
Interest x Expanse of View) x Intent[11]
Seclusion Interest. This is the factum to be secluded. For example, a high Seclusion Interest would
be a factum of a person’s naked body in the bathroom. A low Seclusion Interest would be a factum
openly existing in a heavily travelled public park. The factum of view at the doorstep is
distinct from an aerial photograph at 5,000 feet.
Expanse and Nature of View.
This is the expansiveness of the viewer, nature of the view, how and if
recorded. For example, a police officer,
guest and Google may all see exactly the same factum of the Seclusion Interest;
however, the guest is effectively two eyes, and the police may be two eyes plus
an official recorded report for viewing within the Police department. Google is effectively worldwide unlimited
viewing of the factum, with pervasive recording and indexing. It is this factor that adjusts for the
reality of access, recording, indexing, ease of access and dissemination of
data.
Intention. Intention is the
cause for the view of the factum, and whether the motive is incidental or
self-interested. For example, someone
living on the coastline, might expect a parasailer to
float overhead and see into a backyard with his or her naked eye. However, that is distinct from a situation
where the parasailer has an intention to pry. A police officer would be low intention,
presumably operating for the public good.
That said, the entire
issue is that the Magistrate Judge finally determined that the conduct could
not be “highly offensive to a reasonable person” as a matter of law. [Opinion, A7]
Reasonable expectation is a function of the context.[12] I might have the expectation that the
government will intrude without waiving a right for Google to intrude.
In the Borings’ case,
the Seclusion Interest is the Borings’ home.
The home is secluded off of a private road, past “Private Road No
Trespassing” signage. The photographs
taken are not public views that can be seen without a violation trespass. However, because, in fact, people rightfully
on the land may see the home at times, the weight of the factor is medium.
As to the Expanse and
Nature of View, Google’s recording mechanism, in 360° photography, in conjunction with
pervasive indexing and dissemination, this factor is the extreme high.
As to Intention,
Google is a commercial enterprise motivated by self-interested profit. Google operates with the specific intention
to acquire the pictures that it did, in fact, acquire. Moreover, Exhibit G to the Klausner Decl.
identifies, by Google’s own admission, that the Google driver kept coming
toward the Borings’ home, and kept recording.
Then, thereafter, returned to Google without removing the pictures and
indexing them and publishing them throughout the world without advance notice
or opt-in. Google does not send advance
community notices, nor does it provide the pre-visit or pre-publication opt-in. Google does not assert any community programs
to educate senior citizens and others, for example, who are not educated with
technology to simply remove a property.
Accordingly, this factor is the extreme high.
See, also, Wolfson citing Hill v. National
Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 7 Cal. 4th 1, 865 P.2d 633, 648 (Ca. 1994) (the
degree of the intrusion, the context, conduct and circumstances surrounding the
intrusion as well as the intruder's motives and objectives, the setting into
which he intrudes, and the expectations of those whose privacy is invaded); Dietemann v. Time, 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir.
1971) ("[o]ne who invites another to his home or office takes a risk ...
that the visitor may repeat all he hears and observes when he leaves. But he does not and should not be required to
take the risk that what is heard and seen will be transmitted by photograph or
recording, or in our modern world, in full living color and hi-fi to the public
at large or to any segment of it that the visitor may select.").
We are tricked with
our prejudices about what is usual for the many, but for which there is no
record in this case. It may be that some
people, in finding their property surveilled, would dismiss it without care because
they live on main public road and do not purchase their property for
seclusion. [A30, ¶5]
As the issue is stated in this case, it is the averment, assumed true
for the pleading, that the Borings are secluded. [Borings’ Br. 2, 11-12] The Borings have a reasonable expectation
that, in a civilized society, signage will be obeyed, such as other words of
notice.
After discovery, and
adducing evidence of facts, Google may bring a motion for summary judgment,
demonstrating positive evidence that the private road and driveway are
frequently travelled, etc., if that is the evidence. However, during the pleading stage, a trial
judge has no basis to tell a plaintiff, on the one hand, that amendment will be
futile, and on the other hand, require the plaintiff to plead facts that
“convince.”
Finally, for this federal pleading case, Google attached
the 45-page Streisand case: a
California state court trial opinion (not applicable here), using a unique
state statute and law (not applicable here), for a public figure (not
applicable here), from airspace (not applicable here), without a physical
trespass (not applicable here), post
evidentiary hearing (not applicable here), not tested by appeal (not
applicable here).[13]
V. TRESPASS.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, expressly commands that substantive justice be
done apart from technicalities in Federal court. It does, however, require a demand for the
relief sought. Indeed, that the request
was made: Plaintiff made the claim for compensatory and punitive
damages. [A32, ¶¶17-19
and Prayer for Relief]
Google asserts, such as the Magistrate Judge below, that the
Borings must plead nominal damages at the
inception of their case. But, that
is a euphemism. The real command by the
Magistrate Judge is that a plaintiff must concede
compensatory damages at the inception of
their case, as a matter of law.
Conceding compensatory damages is not a simple concession; it is
tantamount to conceding the most essential nature of the case and a waiver of
an entire theory of recovery.
Google calls the pictures taken as “unremarkable” [Google Br. 1] with the disregard of an ocean for its
drops. But, Google makes its fortune on
publishing “unremarkable”
pictures. Each drop contributes to the
value of the whole and cannot be disregarded.
Landowner owns White Acre. Surveyor recognizes that, if Surveyor could
publish the characteristics of White Acre, Surveyor could make a fortune. Surveyor cannot perform the survey without
physically entering the land for inspection.
Surveyor enters the land and takes the survey. Surveyor does not seek permission, entering
the land without permission. The land is
not injured. The characteristics of the
land were never previously commercialized.
Surveyor publishes the White Acre data and makes a fortune.
From
a damage calculation perspective, the fact that Surveyor does that deed
one-time on White Acre, or multiple times on White Acre, or multiple times on
multiple properties, or one-time for each different property, making it easier
or harder to assess damages, is an accident of math. That is why we have experts. But each drop made its contribution to the
whole of the ocean.
From
common-sense experiential perspective, the Surveyor could have sought
permission, but that would take time and cost money. So Surveyor takes the shot without permission
and disregards property rights, until someone pushes back. It is for such an example that the
Restatement of Restitution 2d (Draft) sets forth, as
follows:
§ 40. Trespass and
Conversion, Comment b. Measure of Recovery. ...Restitution is justified in such
cases because the advantage acquired by the defendant is one that should
properly have been the subject of negotiation and payment...The more difficult
issues of valuation are accordingly those in which the defendant has made a
use of the claimant’s property for which there is no ordinary market; or
in which the defendant has bypassed any market by taking without asking, or by
proceeding in the face of a refusal. Valuation
in such cases resists any precise formula, and courts exercise a wide
discretion in fixing a price for the benefit in question—in other words, a
measure of liability—that will correspond to the unjust enrichment of the defendant. The one constant factor in such cases is that
values will be more liberally estimated against a conscious wrongdoer...
Id., §40. Although Google
does not want it to be so, Restatement of Restitution 2d (Draft) is a perfect
match on this case. [Borings’ Br.
26] It is an objective and well-reasoned
statement of recovery for compensatory damages within the traditional framework
of torts; it is supported by existing case law in Pennsylvania and not
contradicted. [Borings’ Br. 24.] Importantly, it is an objective statement of
how compensatory damages exist with traditional torts when “trees” are not the
subject-matter of what was taken from the trespass, but data. The
Restatement contemplates perfectly the fact that, as we move more to
intellectual data rights, the law must accommodate valuations for intangibles.
With Google’s inclusion of SA-21, this Court now sees the truth
of what the Borings previously asserted. [Borings’ Brief, p. 13., ¶6 (“assured summary judgment on
liability”).
Google asserts that the Borings, in federal court, failed to
satisfactorily plead damages, even though damages are not an element of the
claim. Google implies that there is a
“general federal common law” element
of damage in every federal pleading.
Google is physically on the Borings property without permission,
but there is no trespass because the Borings
failed to concede compensatory damages (even though damages are not a prima
facie element of the claim, as a matter of law), and there are no punitive
damages because the conduct is
prejudged from the pleadings as not outrageous as a matter of law and “public
record” [id.] (including with use of “googling” by the defendant’s own indexing
service), so Google’s liability is, best case, $1. Similarly, the Magistrate Judge stated:
[This] does not change the Court’s conclusion
that the allegations in the Amended Complaint fail to establish a plausible
claim of entitlement to punitive damages.
[Reconsideration, A20]
This conclusion is either because: a) the Borings could have outrageous
conduct but did not technically plead nominal damages; or b) the Borings do not
have a plausible claim for punitive damages on the merits irrespective of
pleading nominal damages. If the former,
it effectively contradicts much of the essence of the privacy claim ruling; if
the latter, the case is, in result, $1,
as a matter of law.[14]
Finally, Google says
the Borings “chose to not use the simple [internet] option Google affords for
removing images....” [Google Br. 1]. If
Google requests it, then Google should compensate for it. Google can compensate for the required
computer equipment, software, Internet connection, our training, the
opportunity cost, the baby-sitter, lost time at work, driver for taking
children to football games, and everything else people are doing to try to make
it through their own busy day. Google is
a probabilities expert. Inertia is
invaluable.
VI. PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
Since
motive of the tortfeasor is involved in punitive damage assessments, it
presupposes discovery into the intent, making it improper to dismiss at the
pleading stage. See Feld v. Merriam, 506 Pa. 383, 395
(Pa. 1984) citing Chambers v. Montgomery,
411 Pa. 339, 345 (Pa. 1963) ("the act itself together with all the
circumstances including the motive of the wrongdoers..." must be considered
in reviewing the punitive damages claim); Martin
v. Johns-Mansville, 508 Pa. 154, 172 (Pa. 1985)
(outrageous conduct are "acts done with bad motive or with reckless
indifference to the interest of others.”); see
also Franklin Music v. ABC, 616 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1979) (court must look
for evidence of aggravated conduct
involving bad motive or reckless indifference).
VII. INJUNCTION.
Google argues the case is to be reviewed de novo, attaches documents, and now
argues waiver in motion practice below.
[See, n. 4, supra; Google Br. 55] Google misses the point of pleading the
injunction request. The injunction is
not only to keep Google from returning, but also to require the destruction and
return of the pictures which would be removed from the mitigation website. It also serves a social interest of informing
others, by public record, that the courts will enforce the fundamental interest
of private property as recorded in government records.
Furthermore,
Google does not represent, and, in fact, does not disclose, exactly what Google
does with the pictures that may have been taken in violation of law.
The
Magistrate Judge used the term “virtual
mapping” in rendering the Opinion. [Opinion, A8] Not having a record or having adduced
evidence, the term is completely undefined by the Magistrate Judge. We should be careful with the term.
When
Google seeks to minimize its broad intention and raise a more necessary elemental social value
proposition, it is a “map”
maker. [Google Br. 16] However, when it suits Google’s argument to
overcome privacy implications, it identifies its purpose as “automatically recording the view that
anyone would see while driving on the street.”
[Google Br. 1].
Street
View is not just a map service “of the
streets,” it is a pervasive recording, indexing and publishing service “from the streets.” MapQuest may be a virtual mapping service; Google “Street View,”
so-named, is a virtual street view
service that has a map component. Maps and street views (particularly if humans
are included in the pictorial view) have different social values. Publication of street views include people and faces.
Google
admits as much. [See, SA-30 “A
Face”] Children are people and children
have faces.
Currently,
Google is the only known company that has the power to systematically traverse
the physical earth and to record “street view” events, and to index and record
this information in its privately owned database. Accordingly, it cannot be said exactly which
“virtual mapping” services were used by the Magistrate Judge in rendering the
statistical analysis of comparable companies, or viability. [Opinion, A8; Borings’ Br. notes 4 and 5, and
accompanying text]
Nevertheless,
removal from the mitigation system does not command action onto Google under
compulsion of law. Irrespective of whether
the pictures continue to be published by Google, the Borings assert that the
pictures are retained in the internal database, subject to mischief, misuse
and/or replication, and the Borings’ request that their pictures be destroyed
under command of law is appropriate.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF.
This case revolves around the presupposition in the
assessment of damage as a matter of law
in a pleading.
Google’s
technology, with its methodology for implementation, is a social phenomenon. There is no equivalent.
It
is speculation to prejudge the general ordinary, as a matter of law, in the context of the unique singular
extraordinary. The result of the
assessment yields a triable fact, because the
question is new by formulaic definition.
Google
cites cases and makes arguments that move us away from considering exactly the
elements of the context that are the cause for this dispute. We merely add this bright-line to Google’s
examples and the cited case law: “and
was the example or defendant, as the case may be: a) on an uninvited
private-interest profit mission; and b) recording, indexing and publishing the
results throughout the world?”
As
stated in the Borings’ Brief at p. 2, offense is contextual. On these facts, this is a case of first
impression, and so the averment of offense must be permitted to survive to test
the question. The Borings are assured
summary judgment for trespass liability.
_____________________________
Some
cases just need to be tried because there is no legal or factual basis to rule
that no two reasonable people will differ in result, as a matter of law, with these facts, in this context.
Indeed, a jury may have a farmer, a computer
technician, a librarian, a senior citizen, a college student, someone still
using a rotary telephone, a naturalist, a police officer, a newly naturalized
citizen, a historian, a single mother with children, and a corporate
executive. Each of these people,
together as a microcosm of our American society, will judge these facts, in this context. And, each will find excuse or offense in such
factor as their respective life history, education and conscience
dictates.
The
Magistrate Judge stated that the Borings failed to partake of Google’s
mitigation website removal system. Let
the senior citizen, the college student, the rotary dial telephone user and the
computer technician battle that question out in the jury room. That is the very purpose of juries and jury
rooms. If that may be ugly in
particular, it is certainly beautiful in essence.
_____________________________
Freedom
begins with the right to be left alone.
Security in property is not an incidental right, it is a fundamental
right — if not the seminal principle upon which the United States of America
was founded. We know that technology and
property rights are not irreconcilable, there just needs to be an incentive.
It is
proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties. We hold this prudent jealousy to be the first
duty of citizens and one of the noblest characteristics of the late
Revolution. The freemen of America did
not wait till usurped power had strengthened itself by exercise and entangled
the question in precedents. ... We
revere this lesson too much ... to forget it.”
James Madison “Memorial
and Remonstrance,” in Rives and Fendall, Letters and
Other Writings of James Madison, 1:163.
I believe there
are more instances of the abridgement of the freedom of the people by gradual
and silent encroachments of those in power, than by violent and sudden
usurpations....This danger ought to be wisely guarded against.
James Madison. Jonathan Elliot, ed. The Debates in the
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, 5 vols.
3:87. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott
Company, 1901.
_____________________________
The
Borings seek reinstatement of the Amended Complaint, Counts I, II, III and V
(with the claim for punitive damages), with a directive to Google to answer in
due course.
Date: October
8, 2009
/s/Gregg
R. Zegarelli/
Gregg R. Zegarelli
PA I.D. #52717
mailroom.grz@zegarelli.com
412.765.0401
/s/Dennis M. Moskal
Dennis M. Moskal, Esq.
PA
I.D. #80106
mailroom.dmm@zegarelli.com
412.765.0405
Counsel
for Appellants
Aaron
and Christine Boring
Z E G A R E L L
I
Technology & Entrepreneurial
Ventures Law
Group, P.C.
Allegheny
Building, 12th Floor
Pittsburgh,
PA 15219-1616
412.765.0400
ADDENDUM A
PRIVACY DISTINCTION TABLE
* Cited by
the Magistrate Judge. Columns are Name, Jurisdiction,
Evidence, Trespass and Description
Name |
Jur |
Evd |
Trsp |
Pub |
Description |
Aquino |
EDPa |
Yes |
No |
Yes |
Publication
of newsworthy events such as divorce events of famous people |
Benitez |
ILApp |
Yes |
No |
No |
Peephole
case |
Borse * |
3rd |
No |
No |
No |
Employment
rights case; drug testing; no trespass; not requiring publication does not
mean not pertinent |
Burger |
PA |
Yes |
No |
No |
Release of
medical records case; invasion of privacy never argued |
CA v Ciraolo |
CaApp |
Yes |
No |
No |
Search
warrants not required for aerial surveillance with naked eye; no profit
motive |
Cason |
FLS |
No |
No |
Yes |
Unflattering
publication of biographical data; privacy claim not dismissed |
Cmw v
Robbins |
PaS |
Yes |
No |
No |
Governmental
investigation of accused criminals, aerial surveillance; no profit motive |
DeAngelo |
PaS |
No |
No |
No |
Business
solicitations alleged intrusion |
DeBlasio |
PaCmw |
No |
No |
No |
Jail cell
case; no expectation of privacy |
Diaz |
EDPa |
No |
No |
No |
Debt
collection case; found for plaintiff; inverse assumption that permitting a
case to proceed on inferences is not equal to denying it from proceeding with
inferences |
Frankel |
EDPa |
No |
No |
No |
Interference
by termination of employment contract for refusal to divorce for religious
reasons |
GTE Mobilnet |
TXApp |
Yes |
No |
No |
Construction
of cell tower overlooking property; no trespass; no recording or publication;
case went to jury |
Harris * |
PaS |
Yes |
No |
Yes |
Newspaper/Media
case publishing welfare recipient information; no intentional intrusion |
ICU Investigat. |
ALS |
Yes |
No |
No |
Surveillance
of a workers compensation claimant; expect investigation/intrusion when file
claim |
Jenkins |
PaS |
Yes |
No |
Yes |
Publication
of moral crimes of public record |
Johnson |
6th |
Yes |
Yes |
No |
Governmental
investigation of accused criminals; no profit motive; no publication |
Jones |
PA DC |
No |
No |
Yes |
Publication
of surrender to a television show host on a murder charge; not private life
when surrender to News Columnist |
Kelleher |
EDPA |
Yes |
No |
Yes |
Employment
context; MSJ; City employee sues Mayor Asst. for publicizing emails regarding
her suspension to media; City Guidelines say no expectation of privacy in
emails. |
Kline |
3rd |
Yes |
No |
No |
Workplace
employee surveillance; no private place |
Konopka |
MDPa |
Yes |
No |
No |
Workplace surveillance;
listening to recording found at workplace desk w/o consent |
Mulligan |
EDPa |
Yes |
No |
No |
Insurance
investigation surveillance; worker's comp claimant no privacy expectation re:
claim investigation; public view |
Oliver |
US |
Yes |
Yes |
No |
Criminal
action re: police actions; open fields case; holds area around home
protected; no profit motive |
Pacitti |
EDPa |
Yes |
Yes |
No |
Entry
during remodeling; no recording; no publication |
Pappa Unum |
MDPa |
No |
Yes |
No |
Insurance investigation
surveillance; expect investigation/intrusion when file claim; no publication |
Pro Golf * |
PA |
No |
No |
Yes |
Commercial
disparagement; privacy not pleaded; statute of limitations ruling only |
Schiller |
ILApp |
No |
No |
No |
Neighbors
capturing non-private data; public could view garage/driveway; no profit
motive |
Shorter |
DSC |
Yes |
Yes |
No |
Insurance
company ignores signage; no publication involved; expect investigation/ intrusion when file claim |
ST v Chaussee |
Wash App |
Yes |
No (Prob Cause) |
No |
Governmental
investigation of accused criminals; no profit motive |
ST v Domicz |
NJS |
Yes |
No |
No |
Governmental
investigation of accused criminals; no profit motive; Google no implied
consent; no publication |
Streisand |
CaS |
Yes |
Aerial |
Yes |
Famous
person; aerial; specific state interest |
Strickland |
PaS |
Yes |
No |
No |
Wrongful
termination claimed from publicity surrounding collection lawsuit |
Tucker |
EDPa |
Yes |
No |
No |
Company investigation
of violation of policy; questions to spouse; no trespass; no citation by
court for "difficult standard to satisfy"; MSJ not pleading stage |
US v Evans |
7th |
Yes |
Yes |
No |
Governmental
investigation of accused criminals; no profit motive; no publication;
Defendant did not present evidence of privacy expectation at hearing |
Vaughn |
TXapp |
Yes |
No |
No |
Neighbor
watching neighbor without blinds drawn; no profit motive; no publication |
Ventling |
SDSD |
Yes |
No |
No |
Governmental
investigation of accused criminals; no profit motive; still photo unpublished |
Wells |
EDPa |
Yes |
No |
No |
Dicta
cited; wrongful termination case; release of terms of separation agreement;
no publication |
Wolfson * |
EDPa |
Yes |
No |
Yes |
Intrusive
actions of press doing article on high salaries of U.S. Healthcare
executives; not dismissed, rather, Defendants enjoined from invading privacy;
customs/motives/ setting needs developed |
Woodside |
EDPA |
No |
No |
No |
Defaulting
Debtors, who were licensed attorneys, claimed Defendant's collection efforts
(ordering sheriff to inventory property for sale, attaching bank accounts)
was invasion of their privacy; Court found that by defaulting on debt, they
voluntarily consented to such collection efforts and so not offensive. |
ATTORNEY
CERTIFICATE OF BAR MEMBERSHIP
I, Gregg Zegarelli, certify
on the date specified below, that I am admitted as an attorney of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and that I am a member of the bar
in good standing.
Date: October
8, 2009
/s/Gregg
R. Zegarelli/
Gregg R. Zegarelli
PA I.D. #52717
412.765.0401
Counsel
for Appellants
Aaron
and Christine Boring
Z E G A R E L L
I
Technology & Entrepreneurial
Ventures Law
Group, P.C.
Allegheny
Building, 12th Floor
Pittsburgh,
PA 15219-1616
412.765.0400
I, Dennis M. Moskal, certify
on the date specified below, that I am admitted as an attorney of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and that I am a member of the bar
in good standing.
Date: October
8, 2009
/s/Dennis M. Moskal/
Dennis M. Moskal, Esq.
PA
I.D. #80106
412.765.0405
Counsel
for Appellants
Aaron
and Christine Boring
Z E G A R E L L
I
Technology & Entrepreneurial
Ventures Law
Group, P.C.
Allegheny
Building, 12th Floor
Pittsburgh,
PA 15219-1616
412.765.0400
I, Gregg Zegarelli,
certify that this Brief complies with the type-volume limitations of Fed.R.App.P. 32(a)(7)(B) because it contains 6,385 words,
including Addendum 1, but excluding parts of the brief exempted by Fed.R.App.P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii). I further certify that this Brief complies
with the typeface requirements of Fed.R.App.P.
32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed.R.App.P.
32(a)(6) because it has been prepared in a non-proportionally spaced typeface
using Microsoft Word 2003 with 10.5 point Courier New typeface.
Date: October
8, 2009
/s/Gregg
R. Zegarelli/
Gregg R. Zegarelli
PA I.D. #52717
412.765.0401
Counsel
for Appellants
Aaron
and Christine Boring
Z E G A R E L L
I
Technology & Entrepreneurial
Ventures Law
Group, P.C.
Allegheny
Building, 12th Floor
Pittsburgh,
PA 15219-1616
412.765.0400
CERTIFICATION OF
IDENTICAL BRIEFS AND VIRUS SCAN
I, Gregg Zegarelli,
certify that the text of the E-Brief and the ten (10) hard copies of the brief
are identical and are submitted on this same date. I further certify that the .PDF file enclosed
was scanned for viruses by Kasperski anti-virus
document verification.
Date: October
8, 2009
/s/Gregg
R. Zegarelli/
Gregg R. Zegarelli
PA I.D. #52717
mailroom.grz@zegarelli.com
412.765.0401
Counsel
for Appellants
Aaron
and Christine Boring
Z E G A R E L L
I
Technology & Entrepreneurial
Ventures Law
Group, P.C.
Allegheny
Building, 12th Floor
Pittsburgh,
PA 15219-1616
412.765.0400
The undersigned certify
that on this date ten (10) true and correct copies of Appellants' Reply Brief were served on Marcia M. Waldron, Clerk of
Court of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit located at 21400 U.S. Courthouse,
601 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA
19106 by Federal Express courier as provided by Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 25(a)(2)(B)(ii), and on the following counsel of record
pursuant to 3rd Cir. L.A.R. 113.4(a) as Filing Users and by U.S. First Class
Mail, postage prepaid, as provided by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
25(c):
Brian P. Fagan, Esq.
Keevican Weiss Bauerle
& Hirsch LLC
11th Floor Federated Investors Tower
1001 Liberty Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA
15222, USA
Tonia Ouellette Klausner, Esq.
Wilson Sonsini
Goodrich & Rosati PC
1301 Avenue of the Americas, New York,
New York 10019, USA
Date: October
8, 2009
/s/Gregg
R. Zegarelli/
Gregg R. Zegarelli
PA I.D. #52717
412.765.0401
/s/Dennis M. Moskal/
Dennis M. Moskal, Esq.
PA
I.D. #80106
412.765.0405
Counsel
for Appellants
Aaron
and Christine Boring
Z E G A R E L L
I
Technology & Entrepreneurial
Ventures Law
Group, P.C.
Allegheny
Building, 12th Floor
Pittsburgh,
PA 15219-1616
412.765.0400
[1] Google Brief of Appellee, September
24, 2009 [hereafter, “Google Br.”]
[2] There is a circuitous irony to the fact that the Magistrate Judge was “Googling” [Opinion, A8] using the defendant Google’s services on a 12(b)(6) motion, and that error is a cause for this appeal. The recording, indexing, ease of access and dissemination of data has its own new social concerns.
[3] Google states, “Based upon the factual allegations found within the four corners of the
Amended Complaint, the District Court properly concluded that the Borings
have not shown they are entitled to relief.” [Google Br. 13, emphasis
added] Then, by very recent Appendix
supplementation (only after the Borings had long written and served their
Opening Brief) Google puts tangible things before this appellate court for
review. These things are improper and
immaterial for the question on appeal, but are addressed briefly below at
Section II in all prudence and caution.
It is important to note that Google did not also attach, for
the convenience of this Court, the picture where Google is close to the
home, i.e., closer to the home than
SA-26 indicates. If this Court is
inclined to review that picture as material to its determination on this appeal,
it is available in the record at Docket 28, Exhibit 2:10. This case was not converted pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(d).
Moreover, Google states, at Google Br. 37, that the review
is de novo, and yet it still
supplemented with tangible things to this Court.
Google has now designated every page of all the briefs below
[Appendix Table of Contents, A36-A103], recently supplemented with tangible
things [SA1-SA31] and cites 105 cases (approximately 1,380 words of case citations), far beyond anything
considered by the Magistrate Judge. The
Borings designated its 7-page pleading. [A29-35]
[4] The Borings are addressing Google’s
pictures out of prudence and caution only.
Not because they are proper for submission to this Court. See
n. 3, supra.
[5] Fed. R. Evid.
201(c).
[6] The “Legal Disclaimer” page is interposed when approaching from the
Allegheny County Assessments Home page.
The Legal Disclaimer page is
also viewable from http://www2.county.allegheny.pa.us/RealEstate/Default.aspx. (emphasis added). The flow from the Assessments Home Page is:
http://www.county.allegheny.pa.us/opa/index.aspx (Off. Prop. Assess. Home) >
http://www2.county.allegheny.pa.us/RealEstate/Default.aspx (Legal Notice) >
http://www2.county.allegheny.pa.us/RealEstate/Search.aspx (the submitted Google
Search page).
[7] It would be an excellent mall survey,
and the relevant market would be general society, not computer users. Since Google chooses to have a opt-out
mitigation system, rather than an opt-in system that would naturally protect
rights, Google should consider a television advertisement and newsprint
campaign. In addition, possibly have
telephone numbers to allow persons, such as senior citizens, the ability to
easily determine if they are affected, or if there is an “inappropriate image”
[SA-28] so as to use the simple procedure made available by Google. [Google Br.
24] It may be simple to get a drink of
water if you are in China, but, of course, you have to get there.
[8] Docket No. 11, Motion to Dismiss
(first), pg. 2.
[9] See,
p. 6, infra.
[10] Streisand v. Adelman, No., SC 077-257 (Super.
Ct. Los Angeles Co. Dec. 31, 2003)
[11] Simply stated: what is the thing that
is being viewed, who is viewing it and what is their intention for the view?
[12] I may thank you for telling me I have
an object in my nostril when we are alone.
But, I would be offended if you should do so from a podium with a crowd
of listeners, and, more particularly, if you laugh and point. The object in my nostril is a constant in all
cases, but the context is distinct and the final offense variable. The result is controlled by the entire
context, not merely the constant. It is
no defense from the podium for the offense that I would thank you for the
conduct if we were alone.
[13] Google’s use of the Streisand case to this Court amplifies
the need for this appeal. If Google is
using the Streisand case here, it is
reasonable to assume that it would use the Magistrate Judge’s ruling below for
the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. The
Magistrate Judge’s ruling must be tested because the implications are grave.
[14] Google points to the Borings not
requesting a second pleading amendment.
[Google Br. 57]. The amendment
would be to concede compensatory damages.
But Google does not push the point too hard though, because the
logistics demonstrate additional error of the Magistrate Judge. Step 1: The Borings indicate they could amend
[Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, Docket 25]; Step 2: As a result of that
statement, the Magistrate Judge indicates in the Opinion “This Court concludes
any attempted amendment would be futile.” [Opinion, A15]; Step 3: The Borings
file for reconsideration of the Order [Reconsideration, Docket 45]; Step 4: The
Magistrate Judge denies reconsideration, indicating a failure to request to
amend that preceded the Order where the Magistrate Judge indicated amending
would be futile. [Reconsideration, A19]
In the Reconsideration Motion, the Magistrate Judge, for the first time,
also referenced the cases not cited by the parties, nor are cited in the
Opinion as a basis for the ruling; these cases are addressed in Borings’ Br.
22-24.